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Abstract
This paper builds a model of government subsidies to 
green products in the face of heterogeneous customers 
with different green perferences. There are two kinds 
of subsidy mechanism in this paper: One is subsidies 
given to green manufactures, and other is subsidies given 
to customers. The result shows that the two subsidies 
both benefit development of green technology. And 
government subsidies given to manufacture can bring 
greater social welfare than those to customers. In addition, 
as green customers increase, the optimal subsidies for 
manufacturers decline, and the optimal subsidies for 
consumers increase.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the problem of global warming is 
becoming more and more serious, which brings serious 
challenges to the survival and development of human 
beings. One way to solve this problem is the adoption 
and application of green technology. However, due 
to the high cost of developing green technology, 
most companies can not afford it. At the same time 
high costs lead to high prices, so the price of green 
products is far higher than consumers can accept. In 
order to promote green technology, government needs 
to introduce a lot of policies, such as green subsidies, 
sewage tax, to promote the production of green 
products.
Nowadays, Government subsidies have been a hot 
topic in academia. Atalay et al. (2009) analyzes that 
recovery subsidies are not necessarily optimal policies. 
Luo (2014) finds that government subsidies can improve 
the sales of electric vehicles; the higher the amount 
of subsidies, the better the performance of the supply 
chain. Zhu et al. (2014) considers two kinds of subsidy 
mechanism that to manufacturers or to consumers. 
The conclusion shows that government subsidies are 
more conducive to the development of manufacturing 
enterprises compared to direct subsidies to consumers. 
Zhou et al. (2015) shows that incentive subsidies can 
promote the development of reverse logistics. Cohen et 
al. (2015) studys the impact of government subsidies to 
consumers on green technology adoption, and shows that 
the subsidy mechanism is sufficient to coordinate the 
system. 
As the market gradually changing from the seller’s 
market to the buyer’s market, more and more scholars 
concern about business decision-making on the impact of 
consumer’s purchase behavior. Zhu and Dou (2011) shows 
that when the green products’ cost is high and consumers’ 
environmental awareness is low, the government should 
be appropriate to adjust the lowest limit of subsidies. Yu 
et al. (2016) find that the increase in consumer awareness 
will encourage companies to produce greener products. 
Sun and Peng (2013) study heterogeneous customers, 
assuming that one type of customer is more sensitive to 
the quality of the product. Zhang and Xiong (2016) find 
that for different consumers, enterprises should adopt 
a variety of production technology, so as to maximize 
corporate profits. 
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In the view of above analysis, this article intends 
to consider heterogeneous customers having different 
sensitivity coefficient on the production cost and using the 
cost of products, and purchase behavior is based consumer 
willingness. Establish different subsidy mechanisms 
such as subsidies to the green business, or subsidies to 
consumers. Furthermore, we compare different subsidy 
mechanisms from the perspective of social welfare and do 
numerical analysis.
1. DEMAND FUNCTION
Consider the decision-making system built by duopoly 
business, heterogeneous customers and government. 
Green enterprise only produces green products, and 
ordinary enterprise only produces ordinary products. The 
production cost of green products is higher, but the using 
cost is lower. And the production cost of ordinary products 
is lower, but the using cost is higher. There are two types 
of customers in the market, green customers who pay 
more attention to whether the product is environmentally 
friendly and ordinary customers who is more concerned 
about the price. 
Green customers are more concerned about using cost 
of products, and ordinary customers are more sensitive 
to the price of the product. Take ordinary customers for 
example, the utility function as follows:
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= − −
The subscript n represents the ordinary customer. 
The superscript 1 represents the green product, and the 
superscript 2 represents the ordinary product. So U1n is 
on behalf of utility function of ordinary customers to 
buy green products. p1, p2, e1, e2 respectively represent 
the price and using cost of green products and ordinary 
products v is retain utility of customer.v is obeying the 
uniform distribution [0,A]. A is the maximum value 
of the retained utility. αn is sensitivity factor for the 
ordinary customer to the price of the product. βn is 
sensitivity factor for the ordinary customer to the using 
cost of the product. Similarly, green consumers’ utility 
function to buy green products and ordinary products as 
follows:
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αg is sensitivity factor for the green customer to the 
price of the product. βg is sensitivity factor for the green 
customer to the using cost of the product, satisfying 
αn>αg ,βg>βn.
The retain utility of the customer determines whether 
to buy product and which product to purchase. Take the 
ordinary customer’s purchase behavior as an example to 
analyze: Ordinary customers to buy green products should 
meet the conditions as:
                       
1 0nU ≥  and  
1 2
n nU U≥
In summary, there are two cases available:
Figure 1
Situation One  
2 2
1 1
n n
n n
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θ
+
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Figure 2
Situation Two 
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θ
+
+ <
Figure 1, assuming v2n is the utility value that ordinary 
customers whether to buy ordinary products. Assuming 
v12n is the utility value when ordinary customers buy 
ordinary products and buy green products without 
difference. Figure 2, assuming v1n is the utility value that 
ordinary customers whether to buy green products. For 
the sake of generality, assuming that the total amount of 
consumers is 1, the proportion of ordinary consumers 
is δ ,  the ordinary customers demand function as 
follows:
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When the demand for ordinary products is zero, 
indicating that no customers are willing to buy ordinary 
products. At this time, ordinary enterprises are out of the 
market. Because this article is to consider the competition 
business, we ignore the situation that demand for ordinary 
products is zero.
Similarly, green consumers demand for green products 
and general products is as follows: 
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Total demand for green products and general products 
is as follows:
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(1 )n gφ δα δ α= + −
 
(1 )n gϕ δβ δ β= + −
,
 
(1 )n gφ δα δ α= + −
 
(1 )n gϕ δβ δ β= + −  respectively 
is average sensitivity factor for customer in the entire 
market to the price and using cost of the product. The 
higher sensitivity of using cost of the product, indicates 
that consumers are more concerned about green degree of 
products, indirectly reflecting consumer higher awareness 
of environmental protection.
2. MODEL
This section will analyze game decision-making between 
the government and enterprise. Government subsidy 
mechanism is divided into two types: First, government 
provide subsidies to green enterprises.  Second, 
government subsidies to consumers’ green behavior. The 
first stage is that the duopoly business determines optimal 
prices and quantities. The second stage is that government 
determine optimal subsidies.
2.1 Subsidies to Green Enterprises
Government subsidies to green manufacturers, indirectly 
reduce the production cost of enterprises, thereby 
promoting enterprise to produce more green products. 
When the government subsidizes the green business, the 
profit of green enterprise producing unit green product 
becomes p1-c1+s1. So green and ordinary enterprises’ 
profits are:
 ( )
( )
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2 2 2 2
M
M
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c1>c2 , in reality, green enterprise for the production 
of green products often requires a lot of human resources 
and equipment, etc., which needs huge amounts of money. 
It will share to every product, so production cost will be 
greater than ordinary production cost.
By the first-order of formula, green and ordinary 
enterprises’ optimal price, quantities and profits can be 
solved:
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From the conclusion 1, when government subsidizes 
green enterprises, the price of green product decreases, 
demand increases, the overall profits of green enterprise 
increase. At the same time, the price of ordinary products 
reduces, which is due to the ordinary products and green 
products to a certain extent can be substituted. When the 
price of green product reduces, the general business will 
adjust the price strategy that reducing the price of ordinary 
products. The demand for ordinary products decreases, 
and the overall profit of general business reduces. And 
when the larger the amount of subsidies, it will large 
benefit green enterprise.
Government will measure effectiveness of subsidy 
mechanism from the angle of social welfare and 
determine the optimal subsidies. The total social welfare 
consists of four parts: duopoly profits, consumer surplus, 
the externality and government expenditure. The 
consumer surplus under subsidizing the manufacturer is 
as follows:
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The consumer surplus includes the surplus of ordinary 
customers buying green products and ordinary products 
and the surplus of green customers buying green products 
and ordinary products.
Assuming that the marginal environmental benefits of 
green products are k, the marginal environmental damage 
of ordinary products is j, and the total social welfare 
function is:
 1 2 1 2 1 1
M M M M M MSW U kd jd s d= Π +Π + + − −
After seeking the first derivative of the equation, can 
get the optimal subsidy value when government subsidizes 
the green manufacture:
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2.2 Subsidies to Customers
When consumers buy green products, government gives 
some subsidies to reduce the purchasing cost of green 
products to attract more consumers to buy green products. 
At this point, the demand function of green products and 
ordinary products changes:
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The profit function of green enterprises and ordinary 
enterprises is as follows:
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By the first-order of formula, green and ordinary 
enterprises’ optimal price, quantities and profits can be 
solved:
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From the conclusion 2, when the government 
subsidizes consumers, the price of green products increases 
and demand increases, and the overall profits of green 
enterprises increase. At the same time, the price of ordinary 
products reduces and the demand reduces, and the profit 
of ordinary enterprises reduces. And when the amount 
of government subsidies increases, it’s more conducive 
to the development of green enterprise. After comparing 
conclusion 2 and 1, we find that when government 
subsidies to consumers, the green product prices increase. 
Indirectly reflecting the phenomenon of subsidy transfer, 
that is, green enterprises will increase the price of the 
product to share some of the government subsidies.
At this point the consumer surplus has changed:
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The social welfare function is:
 1 2 1 2 2 1
C C C C C C CSW U Kd Jd s d= Π +Π + + − −
After seeking the first derivative of the equation, can get the optimal subsidy value when government subsidizes the 
green behavior of customers:
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Conclusion 3: when αn=αg=1, s1
*=s2
*.When not 
considering the heterogeneity of the customer’s sensitivity 
to price of product, the government optimal subsidy 
giving manufacturer or consumer is the same. At this 
point, 
 
1φ = ,combined with conclusions of 1,2, under 
subsidies to consumers and to the manufacturer, two 
policies on the role of inciting green business are equal.
3. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, real data is used to simulate the model. 
Take two different types of cars produced by BYD as an 
example. One is F3, another is Qin EV. We assume that 
the profit of producing a car is 10%. According to the 
manufacturer guide price of car, we can calculate the cost 
of car.
Through the Sohu car network, we can query detail 
information of the car. Through the data available, 
BYD F3 manufacturer guide price is ￥55,900；100 
km fuel consumption is 6.9L / 100 km; a car in its 
life cycle can travel 152,137 miles, 93 gasoline latest 
offer for 6.51 yuan / L, therefore, BYD F3 using cost 
is: 6.9*15.2137*1.61*6.51/100=￥110,000. Qin EV 
manufacturers guide price is ￥259,800. BYD Qin EV 
battery capacity is of 47.5KWh, the maximum mileage 
of 300 km, mileage in life cycle of 152,137 miles , 
energy price of 0.61 yuan / KWh, therefore, BYD 
Qin EV using cost is:(47.5/300)*15.2137*1.61*0.61= 
￥23,7000.
The positive externalities of pure electric vehicles are 
reduced CO2 emissions during their life cycle. According 
to Arar (2010) data analysis, each consumption of 1000 
kWh produces 755 kg of carbon dioxide. So BYD Qin 
EV produces emissions of carbon dioxide: (47.5/300)*
0.152137*1.61*755=29.28 ton CO2. Ordinary fuel cars 
produce 2.8 kg of CO2 per liter of oil. So we can calculate 
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ordinary vehicle emissions of CO2: 2.8*6.9*152,137*
1.61/100,000=47.32 ton CO2. As a result, pure electric 
vehicles save: 47.32-29.28=18.04 ton CO2. According to 
Maxime (2015) , a tonnage of CO2 has a conversion factor 
of 52 $ / ton. Therefore, the positive externalities of pure 
electric vehicles can be obtained as: 52*7*18.04/10,000=
￥6,600. The negative externalities of ordinary cars is : 
52*7*47.32/10,000=￥17,2000. Therefore, the parameters 
are summarized as:
c1=23.62,c2=5.08,e1=2.37,e2=11,k=0.66, j=1.72.The 
other parameters are set as :
θ=0.8, A=110, αn=1.5, αg=1, βn=1, βg=1.5.
(a) The effect of parameters δ on optimal subsidies and 
social welfare
From Figure 3, when the proportion of green 
customers in the market  increases,  the opt imal 
subsidies to the manufacturer decrease. This is because 
when the government subsidies to green enterprises, 
the price of green products declines. So the utility 
of consumers increases, optimal subsidies show a 
downward trend. On the contrary, the optimal subsidies 
to the consumers increase. This is because when the 
government subsidizes to consumers, the green product 
prices increase and consumer utility declines. At 
this time, government should increase the amount of 
subsidies.
Figure 4 shows that when there are more and more 
green customers in the market, the social welfare under 
the two subsidy mechanisms is improving. And the social 
welfare is greater when subsidies to the manufacturers 
than the subsidies given to consumer. Without any 
financial constraints, government should give priority to 
subsidies to manufacturers in order to bring better social 
welfare.
(b) The effect parameters θ on optimal subsidies and 
social welfare
Figure 5
The Effect of θ on the Optimal Subsidy
Figure 6
The Effect of θ on the Social Welfare
Figure 3
The Proportion of Green Consumers (1-δ) on  the 
Impact of the Optimal Subsidies 
Figure 4
The Proportion of Green Consumers (1-δ) on the 
Impact of the Social Welfare
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From the above figure, when θ increases, the optimal 
subsidies drop. When θ is greater, indicate that higher 
replacement of two types of products, competition 
between products is servious. Enterprises in order to 
obtain more customers often take the price war. The price 
of two kinds of products decreases significantly. So the 
utility of the consumer increases, optimal social subsidies 
drop. Figure 6 shows that θ increases and social welfare 
also increases.
CONCLUSION
For the above analysis, we get the following conclusion:
(a) Government subsidies to green enterprises, the 
green product prices decline, green business profits 
increase. When government subsidizes consumers who 
buy green products, the price of green products is rising. 
Because green companies tend to shift some of the 
consumer subsidies by raising prices. Both mechanism 
can promote the development of green enterprises.
(b) When replacement of two types of products 
is small, green enterprises should increase the green 
technology investment in order to improve green degree 
of product. When two types of products are easy to 
replace, the green business should be more concerned 
about controlling producing cost, corresponding reducing 
product prices in order to attract more customers. Such as 
BYD will reduce the cost of new energy vehicles by 30% 
in five years.
(c) When the proportion of green customers in the 
market increases, subsidies to the manufacturer’s optimal 
subsidies drop and subsidies to the consumer’s rise. And 
without considering the premise of financial constraints, 
subsidies to manufacturers are better than subsidies to 
consumers. When not considering the heterogeneity of the 
customer’s sensitivity to price of product, the government 
optimal subsidy giving manufacturers or consumers is the 
same.
This paper only considers deterministic demand, 
the uncertainty of demand can be studied in future. In 
addition, this paper assumes that consumer utility is 
uniform distribution, and other types of distribution are 
research directions in future.
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